← Securing Autonomous AI Agents
Blast-radius control 02 of 05
02

Sandboxed execution

Default-deny everything outside the sandbox.

Agents that execute code run in ephemeral, network-restricted, filesystem-restricted containers. No ambient credentials. No egress except what you explicitly allowlist. This applies especially to MCP servers: every server you install gets the same trust surface as the calling agent. Run them in a jail so the worst-case outcome is a corrupted scratchpad, not a compromised host.

// MCP server running with host-level trust. Don't do this.
const mcp = spawnMCPServer('npx @acme/filesystem-mcp')
// That package now has your ~/.aws, your ~/.ssh, your env vars.

// Sandbox it instead.
const server = await Sandbox.create('acme/filesystem-mcp', {
  network:        'none',      // no egress
  readonlyRootfs: true,       // no writes outside mounts
  user:           'nobody',   // no ambient uid privileges
  mounts: [
    // Only the workspace. Nothing else is visible.
    { host: workspaceDir, container: '/workspace', readonly: false },
  ],
  // Scoped credentials only. No inherited host environment.
  env: { WORKSPACE_TOKEN: scopedToken },
})

const mcp = connectMCP(server.socketPath())

If the worst it can do is corrupt its own scratchpad, you've won.

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About the author

is a security leader focused on AI application security. These controls come from his opening keynote at the SF AppSec & DevSecOps Summit. More talks and background at aaronininfosec.com.